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Abstract Relationships between empirical and philosophical approaches to the 
law have not been always peaceful. Agreement seems the most natural way to 
build up and implementing regulations and justice within human-machine inter-
faces (natural and artificial societies), and might help to bridge the gap between 
both theoretical approaches. Recent researches on relational law, relational jus-
tice, crowdsourcing, regulatory systems and regulatory models are introduced. 
These concepts need further clarification, but they stand as political companions to 
more standard conceptions of law in the Semantic Web.  
2. 1 Introduction: Relational Justice  
Ossowski (2012) introduced the issue of computing agreements.  
This chapter addresses the issue of legal agreements in a 
complementary way. The web fosters personalization and 
democratization (D’Aquin et al. 2008). I will refer to these legal 
forms as relational justice. From a theoretical point of view, let’s 
assume broadly that relational justice intersects with relational law 
―the concrete social and economic bonds among the parties in 
business, companies, corporations or other organizations. 
    User-centered strategies of the next Semantic Web generation ― 
the so-called Web of Data― fit well into this perspective, in which 
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rights and duties belong to a new regulatory framework because the 
networked information environment is transforming the marketplace 
and the relations with the state. Cloud computing, cooperation, 
multiple use of mobile phones, crowdsourcing, and web services 
orientation constitute the next step for the World Wide Web. This is 
the social environment of the relational justice field, where scenarios 
and contexts are shaped from a hybrid use of different technologies 
by a multitude of different users (including MAS). 
However, from the legal point of view, all what it seems new can 
sink into the deep waters of the legal ocean. What does ‘agreement’ 
mean in this kind of ecological environment? How can it be 
understood and theorized? And how does it link with what 
‘agreement’ means in the rich legal tradition? 
This chapter, planned as a conceptual and historical overview, 
deals with the latter question. The issue around the concept of 
agreement in law is addressed in Section 2. Section 3 shows three 
different ways of theorizing agreements in the legal theory of the 
20th century. Section 4 describes the origins and development of 
relational law. Finally, I will primarily discuss the implications for 
agreement technologies in Section 5.  
2. 2 Agreement in law 
One of the most popular legal Dictionaries online differentiates two 
different meanings of ‘agreement’ in law: “1) any meeting of the 
minds, even without legal obligation; 2) another name for a contract 
including all the elements of a legal contract: offer, acceptance, and 
consideration (payment or performance), based on specific terms.”1 
These two meanings are carried on by a multitude of different legal 
words, which can be nuanced regarding to the specific terms and 
conditions of the agreement.2  The “languages” of law, the symbols 
                                                          
1 http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/agreement  
2 (I) Agreement as concurrence: accord, amity, arrangement, assent, common 
assent, common consent, common view, community of interests, concord, con-
formance, congruence, congruency, congruity, consent, consentaneity, consenta-
neousness, consentience, consonance, cooperation, good understanding, harmony, 
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through which law is expressed, conveyed and formulated, encom-
pass all forms of ancient and modern natural languages (Mellinkoff, 
1963), and foster legal dictums and mottos ―the ancient (and not 
always consistent) brocards. Eg. Conventio vincit legem [Agree-
ments overrule statutes], Conventio facit legem [Agreements make 
the law], or Pacta sunt servanda [Agreements have to be fulfilled].  
It is worthwhile to highlight the strength of agreements in ancient 
and medieval law. In pre-modern societies, ties among relatives, so-
cial groups and the community had the additional value of being a 
survival bond in everyday life (Watson, 1989). We can understand 
then the non-intuitive point of a value-correlated chain between the 
two legal meanings pointed out, the epistemic and the behavioral 
one ―the implicit cognitive agreement about something, and the ex-
plicit proactive and intentional agreement on some plan of action or 
expected behavior.  
From the political point of view, the problem can be formulated as 
the limitation of the ruler’s power (usually the monarch, but often 
the tyrant). From the legal point of view, it goes as the birth of the 
obligation to fulfill the agreement because of the existence of this 
same agreement. When might it be enforced? At what moment does 
it appear the obligatio, the binding power that qualifies as enforcea-
ble the link between the subjects of the agreement? And, even more 
important, can regulatory effects of agreements do exist outside of 
legal formalism? 
This was the origin of the theory of causality in law, as explained 
by Lorenzen (1919): 
Roman law, even in the last stage of its development, did not enforce an agree-
ment unless it could be brought under certain well-defined heads of contracts or 
pacts. In the time of Justinian all agreements would become actionable by being 
clothed in the form of a stipulation, which for practical purposes may be re-
garded as equivalent to a written form. (…). In all real contracts the obligation 
                                                                                                                                     
meeting of the minds, mutual assent, mutual promise, mutual understanding, one-
ness, reciprocity of obligation, settlement, unanimity, understanding, uniformity, 
unison, unity. (II) Agreement as contract: alliance, arrangement, bargain, binding 
promise, bond, commitment, compact, concordat, concordia, contractual state-
ment, convention, covenant, deal, engagement, legal document, mutual pledge, ob-
ligation, pact, pledge, settlement, transaction, understanding, undertaking.  
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arose not from the agreement of the parties but from the delivery of property or 
the performance of the plaintiff’s promise, that is, in our terminology, from an 
executed consideration3. 
 
In other words, nude pacts were not enforceable unless they en-
tered into a more concrete formal way, in a process of ritualization 
in which certain use of words and mise en scene to produce artificial 
effects close to religion and magic were due.4 These legal grounds 
were the causa of the contract. An agreement had to show an under-
lying “cause” to become a contract. There were no contracts sine 
causa, “without cause”. 
With us an agreement is actionable unless there is some reason why it should 
not be so. With the Romans an agreement was not actionable unless there was 
some reason why it should be so. (Buckland, quoted by Lorenzen, 1919) 
I think that at least three consequences can be drawn from this 
statement: (i) asserting what a legal agreement is or could be is a 
theoretical issue, in which jurists have been involved since the Ro-
man times; (ii) defining ‘agreement’ as a concept means activating 
at the same time a certain degree of inner knowledge of the legal 
system in which the definition works; (iii) discrete categories of 
agreement are at odds with the continuum between nude pacts and 
more coercive forms of contracts. 
Taxonomies are entrenched with the concrete performance of 
types of agreements susceptible to variations. A set of “nearly con-
sidered” contracts do exist either in the Roman or in contemporary 
Civil Law.5 Lorenzen’s conclusion is nowadays a common belief.6 
                                                          
3 In the Common Law consideration is the correlative of causa in the Civil  
Law.  “Something of value given by both parties to a contract that induces them to 
enter into the agreement to exchange mutual performances.” http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/consideration 
4 But see the warning by MacCormack (1969) on going too far in the “magi-
cal” interpretation of law in pre-modern societies 
5 Cfr. Radin (1937).The Institutes of Justinian (III, 13) divided obligations "in-
to four species; ex contractu, quasiex contractu; ex maleficio, quasi ex maleficio, 
i. e. contract, quasicontract; tort, quasi-tort. Gaius, (about 150 A. D.) listed only 
contract, tort and an unclassifiable miscellaneous group, ex variis causarum figu-
ris. 
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What happened, then?  
The most natural explanation is the occurrence of the modern 
state, since the 17 c., and the formulation of the legal framework of 
the rule of law in the 19 c. One of the main contributors to the doc-
trine of causality in law was Jean Domat (1625-1696), the French ju-
rist who at the same time, within the Traité des loix7, organized in 
one single legal body the public order system of Louis XIV. There is 
a direct line from this theoretical body and the French Civil Code 
(1804), through which Napoléon intended the political reconstruc-
tion of the nation-state, stemming from the administrative organiza-
tion of the Ancien Régime.8  
Dialogue as a source of law disappeared from legal thought with 
the construction of the Monarchic state (16 c.17 c.).9 Since the 18 c. 
agreements as covenants or pacts adopted other legal forms and had 
other roles, either grounding civil codes in the new private space or 
constitutions in the public one. Since the 19 c., what lies behind the 
gradual compulsory enforcement of a legal agreement is the compul-
sory force of the state under the rule of law. 
2. 3 Agreement in legal theory 
Legal theory in the 20 c. took seriously this mutual embedment be-
tween law and the state. Although it may come as a little surprise, 
                                                                                                                                     
6 “There is in reality no definable ‘doctrine’ of causa. The term ‘causa’ inclu-
des a variety of notions which may equally well be derived from the nature of a ju-
ristic act and from considerations of equity.” (Lorenzen, 1919) See also Orestano 
(1989).  
7 The Traité des Loix is the preface of Les lois civiles dans leur ordre naturel 
(1689), in which Domat equated Roman and Civil Law with rational order and 
with Christian principles. Law is raison écrite.  
8 See the intellectual and personal genealogy from Domat (17 c.), Pothier (18 
c,) and the nine drafters of the Code Civile (19 c.) in Arnaud (1973). See also 
Tarello (1976).  
9 I have developed this subject in Casanovas (2010). For a specific study on the 
transformation of humanist dialectics and rhetoric in 16 c. and 17 c., cfr. Ong 
(1958) and Fumaroli (1980). 
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thinking simultaneously a theory of law and the state was not com-
monplace in jurisprudence until the last third of the 19 c., after the 
unification of the German State in 1871.  
Perhaps the first full theory of this kind is Georg Jellinek’s 
Allgemeine Staatslehre (1900). It was clear for him, following pre-
vious Romanist (i.e. von Jhering, Gerber) and Germanist (i.e. von 
Gierke) scholars, that the State could be considered a moral person, 
susceptible of holding rights and duties. If this is so, the private no-
tion of agreement could be expanded to the public sphere: as sub-
jects of law, states would behave and act as a person, and actually 
the regulatory value of agreements between private persons ―their 
‘subjective rights’― would be defined by the ‘objective’ laws of the 
states in the public sphere.  
2.3.1  Hans Kelsen 
This is the path trodden on by Hans Kelsen’s Reine Rechtslehre 
[The Pure Theory of Law] as well. In its last version, as late as 1960, 
he still fights the ‘fiction’ of freedom of self-determination as a 
source of law.10 
To me, this denial it is not what it counts and it is important in 
Kelsen’s approach for what he was really questioning through the 
critique of the concept of autonomy was the concept of legality it-
self. Why can we qualify an act of legal or illegal? How to define the 
obligation to do or not do something as legal? Kelsen would set up 
his theory of norms to answer this kind of questions. He conceived it 
as a complementary balance between norms ―“schemes of interpre-
tation”, “the meaning of acts of will”― and normative decisions, in 
which the link between norms and facts would be performed by the 
formal quality of their normative content ―the property of validity. 
Norms had to be legally ‘valid’ to acquire a ‘binding’ character and 
                                                          
10 “The fictiousness of this definition of the concept of the subject of law is 
apparent.(…). The legal determination ultimately originates in the objective law 
and not in the legal subjects subordinated to it. Consequently there is no full self-
determination even in private law.” (Kelsen, 1960, 1967: 170-71; see 258 as well) 
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be applied. In such a conception, the State was conceived as a logi-
cal prius, in a pure neo-Kantian way.  
It is not my aim to go deeper into it. It is worth to notice that 
Kelsen broadened up the space to discuss legal issues on different 
grounds than plain jurisprudence. Instead of discussing just at the 
level of positive legal doctrine, he would have shown the need to 
structure a coherent theory about the tools employed to describe and 
operate on legal systems. And nevertheless, his conceptual frame-
work remained solidly anchored onto the same doctrinal bases he 
tried to overcome. As Alf Ross (1936, 2011) would put it on the first 
edition of the full version of the theory (1935), in Kelsen´s view “le-
gal science is not social theory but normative cognition, doctrine 
[emphasis added, P.C.]”. 
2.3.2 Alf Ross 
However, although he wanted legal theory to be a non-doctrinal so-
cial science clearing up old and broad legal concepts, Ross remained 
close to Kelsen as regards the reflecting value of agreements as a 
source of law. His argument is interesting to follow, because in his 
major work he would compare agreements to promises: 
If it has been agreed that in order to gain admittance to a private night club a 
person must utter a meaningless word, this word in itself will remain mean-
ingless even if by agreement it functions as a directive to the doorkeeper. The 
position is exactly the same in pronouncing a promise. In itself, abstracted 
from the legal order, the expression ‘I promise’ is meaningless. It would just 
do as well to say abracadabra. But by the effect the legal order attaches to the 
formula it functions as a directive to the judge and can be used by private par-
ties for the exercise of their autonomy. (Ross, 1959) 
 May we substitute doorkeeper for judge, the private nightclub for 
the legal order and abracadabra for the ‘will’ of an agreement (or a 
promise) ad we would obtain a quite precise ―and unintended 
kafkian― image of Ross’ legal theory. “A legal rule is neither true 
nor false; it is a directive” (ibid.) addressed to judge, that is to say, 
an utterance “with no representative meaning but with intent to exert   
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influence” (ibid.).11 What it counts then is the binding force of a “na-
tional legal order”, which is an integrated body of rules whose func-
tion is to carry out the exercise of this physical force. 
We need two more ideas to complete the picture: (i) Compliance 
with rules and rule enforcement are related through patterns of be-
havior, operating in judges’ mind or in the legal consciousness of the 
population, which eventually would agree to comply with the law 
according to the dynamics shown in Fig. 1; (ii) ‘validity’ is an em-
pirical property of rules related to the judges’ behavior, for “valid 
law is never a historical fact, but a calculation, with regard to future” 
(ibid.). ‘Validity’ stands for the binding force of the law, but it is not 
an inter-normative property, for it cannot be derived from norms but 
stems from the social behavior itself ―”the relation between the 
normative idea content and the social reality” (ibid.).  
 
Compulsory system
Interested
Behavior
Belief in Validity
(Uninterested Behavior)
Enactment of
“Valid Norms”
by Authorities
 
Fig. 1. Compliance with the law. Source: Ross (1946) 
 
Ross’ positions and the so-called Scandinavian realism have been 
recently revisited by legal theorists. For our purposes, I will single 
out only two revisions. The first one points at what Ross left out of 
                                                          
11 The interested reader is invited to follow the late formulation of the argu-
ment in Ross (1968): “Directives which are impersonal and heteronomous-
autonomous include the rule of games and similar arrangements grounded on 
agreements.” 
 
9 
the legal system: reasoning through the “intermediate legal con-
cepts” of jurisprudence, the semantics of law. The second is in a 
sense complementary to the former one. It states the proximity be-
tween social positivism and Ross’s approaches to fundamental prob-
lems, mainly the problem of validity of legal rules.  
By intermediate legal concepts are meant “those concepts through 
which legal norms convey both legal consequences and precondi-
tions of further legal effects” (Sartor, 2009). Sartor uses the term in-
ferential links (broader than legal norms, or rules) to describe how 
legal concepts (but other concepts as well, e.g. moral or social) can 
carry on and transfer meaning. He is embracing then the Fregian 
view according to which the meaning of a term results from the set 
of inferential links concerning the sentences in which the term oc-
curs (ibid.).  
This view was advanced by Ross in a famous paper, Tû-Tû (1957), 
in which he figured out a fictional society with concepts represent-
ing fictional facts or states of mind (tû-tû).  
FOR ANY (x) IF x eats of the chief’s food THEN x is tû-tû, which really 
means, connecting this factual precondition to deontic conclusions  FOR ANY (x) 
IF x eats of the chief’s food THEN x should be purified, or x is forbidden from 
participating in rites. 
Ross aims at stating that this kind of intermediate terms are also 
fictional, because they are not adding any deontic meaning to the 
whole reasoning and they are not needed to represent any semantic 
content. This reproduces the abracadabra argument for promises: 
doctrines about ownership, or other legal concepts such as claims or 
rights, are just meaningless terms to facilitate the deontic conclu-
sions in a legal order. From a theoretical point of view they are use-
less, and we should get rid of them. This task “is a simple example 
of reduction by reason to systematic order” (Ross, 1957).  
We encounter here the rejection of the “magic” power of words, 
one of the subject-matters of Hägerström philosophy (Pattaro, 2010). 
However, asserting that the concept of right has no substance is 
quite different than stating that it does not carry on any meaning. 
Sartor is proposing an alternative solution, setting an inferential 
field for legal meanings to encompass dogmatic concepts as well 
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within the legal system. As I will show later on, this position has to 
do with the possibility to reasoning with ontologies in the web. 
However, it takes into account also what we may call the pervasive-
ness and resilience of some fundamental legal concepts that bridge 
the common understanding of what law is about.  
2.3.3 H.L.A. Hart 
Law expressed through its common or natural language, the se-
mantics of law, constitutes the timber of perhaps the most influential 
work of legal theory in the 20 c., Herbert Hart’s The Concept of law 
(1961).  
I will chose an indirect approach here, because I will bring to the 
fore the second revision I mentioned above. It deals with the natural 
language in which Ross expressed his analysis, and it comes from 
the new generation of the Scandinavian legal theory that he helped 
to build. Svein Eng (2011) explains that the most central technical 
term in Alf Ross’s book Om ret og retfærdighed (1953) [translated 
as On Law and Justice, 1959] is gældende ret [valid law, in Dan-
ish].12 This corresponds to the Norwegian term gjeldende rett and the 
Swedish term gällande rätt. 
Those Scandinavian terms have been translated into English as va-
lidity, but have different uses which express a broader and more con-
text-sensitive meaning. In Latin languages, e.g., gældende ret has 
been translated by derecho vigente, diritto vigente or droit en 
vigueur for it points at the efficacy of the legal rules as well.  
Hart made the review of Ross‘s book, pointing at the differences 
between their theories. Short after, he published The Concept of Law 
(1960), in which he sets up a broad conceptual framework to eluci-
date the meaning of the most common legal concepts assuming that 
                                                          
12 Eng (2011) recalls that in Ross’ theory, the term gældende ret refers to  “(i) 
normative meaning-content in the form of directives (ii) that have the property of 
being part of the judge’s motivation when he is reaching a decision in the case at 
hand”. 
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law is embedded into society and it rules over their members, in-
cluding the members of the ruling elite.  
Social and legal rules are differentiated, because in complex socie-
ties rules with social content adopt a legal form, according to which 
secondary rules ―of change, recognition, and recognition― operate 
over the primary ones, controlling the production, enforcement and 
implementation of new rules, and solving possible conflicts among 
them. The rule of recognition plays then the same fundamental role 
than the set of directives than Ross would call “sources of law”13 
(and Kelsen, Grundnorm).  
To our purposes, I will pinpoint only three points of the Hart mod-
el: (i) Hart maintains separate the “internal” and “external” points of 
view about rules, depending upon the degree of commitment and 
operability (according to different social roles in the system, citizen, 
judge, expert etc…);14 (ii) the “rule of recognition” is in fact a com-
plex criterion of identification that might encompass different kind 
of behaviors and rule interpretations (depending onto the legal sys-
tem we are facing at); (iii) if the “rule of recognition” might be used 
not only to identify individual rules but to indicate also whether or 
not they are ‘legal’, then this criterion is not only about the ‘validity’ 
of rules but about the existence of the whole system as well. 
Officers, civil servants, are maintained separated from members of 
the community (the ‘civil society’), following the empiricist dual 
pattern for sovereignty obedience/sovereign common since The Le-
viathan (1651) in political philosophy. Secondary rules have to be 
accepted by, and are really addressed to, state officers. Conceptual 
understanding of the rules is the common path to their compliance. 
Social interactions are glued by the dynamics of the internal and ex-
ternal point of view, which goes necessarily through the semantics 
of language. This position seems to open a gap between social posi-
                                                          
13 In Ross’s theory, sources of law “are understood to mean the aggregate of fac-
tors which exercises influence on the judge’s formulation, of the rule on which he 
bases his decision.” (Ross, 1959) 
14 According to Hart, “the observer may, without accepting the rules himself, as-
sert that the group accepts the rules, and thus may from outside refer to the way in 
which they are concerned with them from the internal point of view.” (Hart 1961) 
 
12  
tivism, as it is conceived by Hart, and Ross. Nevertheless, a closer 
look to the grounds of both positions leads to a unified and coherent 
conception of the law, referring not only to the validity of legal 
rules, but to their existence, as interpretive schemes are ‘shared’ by 
groups, be they lawyers, the population or (especially) judges (Eng, 
2011). Interestingly, legal positivists discussed on the content of 
“agreements as concurrence”, but accorded the same relative value 
to “agreements as contracts”.  
2. 4 Agreement in socio-legal theory 
I have presented so far the conceptualization of agreements in the 
classical theory of law of the 20 c. But, before going further in the 
argumentation, let’s go to the socio-legal side of legal theory. I will 
not describe in this section the traditions of pure sociology or psy-
chology, but only the so-called Legal Realist tradition of the thirties, 
and some Law & Society approaches that followed up regarding re-
lational law.  
2.4.1 Karl Llewellyn 
As his late editor, Frederik Schauer (2011) has recently reminded, 
according to Llewellyn’s The Bramble Bush (1930), rules are no 
more than “pretty playthings”. Rule reckonability would lay in mul-
tiple situated forms, adapted to what Llewellyn calls situated con-
cepts, working  practices, devices.15  
Llewellynesque has become a common expression in legal theory 
to characterize informal writing. But I think that it would be mis-
                                                          
15 “[…] I am not going to attempt a definition of law. (…). I have no desire to 
exclude anything from matters legal. (…). I shall instead devote my attention to 
the focus of matters legal. I shall try to discuss a point of reference; a point of ref-
erence to which I believe all matters legal can most usefully be referred.” (Llewel-
lyn, 1930a) 
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leading to believe that his loose and sometimes bizarre expressions 
are merely rhetoric. I have plotted in Fig. 2 the structure of the legal 
realist approach he was advancing in 1930 (Llewellyn, 1930a). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Legal Realism approach, based on Llewellyn (1930a) 
 
Following Pound, law-in-action is opposed to law-in-books, and 
paper rules are opposed to the working ones. There is no mechanical 
way to decide whether a rule is legal or not: this is left to the varia-
ble conditions set by the actors and to the conventions accepted by 
the market or the social community in which legal acts and rules op-
erate. In a way, then, language is experienced and reflected as felt or 
accepted into the rules, but meaning is a function of too many varia-
bles to be structured as an object (in a contract e.g.). There is no way 
to fix a stable meaning, as there is no way to fix a stable legal stand-
ard or value. The internal criterion for meaning or legality is doubled 
and revamped by externalities, first within the legal community, and 
then within the open society (market sectors, organizations, and the 
political community).  
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It is worthwhile to notice the division between informal and for-
mal control (performed by the law, especially through organized ju-
dicial institutions and behavior). But this comes from the first-hand 
knowledge that Llewellyn possessed of Max Weber’s sociology and 
of German legal philosophy. 
It seems to be a common bond between public law and legal phi-
losophy. Jellinek, Kelsen, Hart, Ross… were all public law scholars. 
Llewellyn, on the contrary, was the Chief Reporter of the USA Uni-
form Code of Commerce from its inception in 1940 until his death in 
1962. The code was his main contribution, and it was a revolution-
ary one. Section 1-201(3) of the U.C.C defines agreement as “the 
bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by impli-
cation from other circumstances including course of dealing or us-
age of trade or course of performance as provided in this Act. [em-
phasis added P.C.]” 
American scholars have underlined the significance of this legal 
change with respect the understanding of contract as a formal prom-
ise (Patterson, 1989; Breen, 2000; Blair, 2006). It is a departure from 
previous Holmes, Landell and Willinston’s interpretations of the of-
fer-acceptance-consideration model.16 Patterson (1989) has extracted 
the underlying conception of language ―contract terms do not have 
a plain meaning, and written contract terms might not have priority 
over all unwritten expressions of agreement: 
Under the Code, as Llewellyn conceived it, the meaning of contract terms was 
not a function of intent, mercantile or otherwise. In construing the meaning of a 
contract, a court should focus not on what the parties mentally intended by their 
words but on what the trade took the words to mean. (...) Llewellyn believed 
that there should be no unitary concept of contract or agreement, only a myriad 
                                                          
16 As Breen (2000) puts forward, under the Code: (i) “ the context of an agreement 
—the unspoken background of beliefs and understandings formed by repetition 
within an industry and familiarity among individuals, which are taken for granted 
by the parties involved— becomes central to the meaning of the contract. Contex-
tual evidence is thus fully recognized as an ‘effective part’  of the agreement it-
self.”  (ii) Art. 2 states that the meaning of a written agreement is determined not 
only “by the language used by [the parties] but also by ‘ their action[s], read and 
interpreted in the light of commercial practices and other surrounding circum-
stances”  (U.C.C. Id. § 1-205 cmt. 1.). 
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of ways that parties could come to agreement against the background of com-
mercial practice. [Emphasis added P.C.]”  
2.4.2 Relational law 
Coming from legal realism, socio-legal scholars have embraced a 
pluralist perspective and they do not refer to a validity criterion or a 
validity rule to describe norms or rules as social artifacts. The legal 
field is defined, e.g., as “the ensemble of institutions and practices 
through which law is produced, interpreted, and incorporated into 
social decision-making. Thus, the field includes legal professionals, 
judges, and the legal academy.” (Trubek et al. 1994) From this be-
havioral perspective, they actually do not embrace one version of le-
gal pluralism but many, based on multiple regulatory forms that I 
have summarized elsewhere (Casanovas, 2002). Pluralisms lead to 
different social approaches and methodologies. However, legal theo-
ry and social studies have been often seen as opposite.  
One of the reasons for such a situation lies on the first stages of re-
lational law. Legal realists understood that law was ‘relational’ as an 
adversarial shift from the existing approaches and as a self-
affirmative action. Llewellyn (1931) posed it as “Pound’s develop-
ment of ‘relation’ as a status-like element constantly latent and now 
re-emergent in our order”. Roscoe Pound, in a series called “The end 
of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought” (1914, 1917) ―the Har-
vard papers that constituted the bases for The Spirit of the Common 
Law (1921)― explained the history of the Common Law tradition as 
opposed to the Roman Civil Law tradition:  
The idea of relation, and of legal consequences flowing therefrom, pervades every 
part of Anglo-American law. (…). The action for use and occupation may only be 
maintained where a relation exists. When the relation does exist, however, a train 
of legal consequences follows. (Pound, 1917)  
Therefore, the “spirit” of Anglo-American Law would be rela-
tional (and not authoritative), bottom-up (more than top-down), and 
collective (as opposed to the individual trend of natural law philoso-
phy). However, more recently, this way of constructing a broad legal 
16  
perspective contrasting to other concurrent ones has twisted in favor 
of particular approaches. This is the second step for relational law. 
‘Relational’ is considered a common property that emerges from 
the existing social and economic bonds among companies, provid-
ers, customers, consumers, citizens (or digital neighbors).  It seems 
to be a pervasive quality, perhaps straddling too many genres and 
fields, from psychology to jurisprudence, and from political science 
to business managing and marketing studies.17  
Relational refers to the capacity to set up a common space of mu-
tual relations ―a shared regulatory framework― in which some rec-
iprocity is expected with regard to goods, services, attitudes and ac-
tions. Thus, relational law is more based on trust and dialogue than 
on the enactment of formal procedures or on the enforcement of 
sanctions. This has been proved especially useful regarding the 
analysis of norms ― e.g. in consumer research studies (Johar, 2005), 
in B2B relationships (Blois and Ivens, 2006), in relational govern-
ance (Ott and Ivens, 2009). 
Either Stewart Macauley (1963), Ian R. MacNeil (1974, 1983, 
1985, 2001) or Phillip Blumberg (2005) stress a view of contracts as 
relations rather than as discrete transactions looking at the evolving 
dynamics of the different players and stakeholders within their living 
constructed shared contexts. “Relational norms”18, “relational ex-
change norms”, and “relational contract” are concepts widely used 
since. By the term “relational thinking” it is meant an approach em-
phasizing the complex patterns of human interaction that inform all 
exchanges (MacNeil, 1985). But in fact this does not mean getting 
rid of a more conventional notion of what law is or how lawyers 
think (for a good comprehensive summary of MacNeil’s works, see 
Campbell, 2001). More recent studies confirm that there is no simple 
                                                          
17 ‘Relational’ has been applied not only to contracts but to sovereignty (Stacey, 
2003), rights (Minow and Shandley, 1996), copyright (Craig, 2011), governance 
(Zeng et al., 2008; Chelariu and Sagntani, 2009), and conflicts (Wallenburg and 
Raue, 2011), broadening up the field from private law to the public domain. 
18 MacNeil (1983) distinguishes five relational norms ―role integrity, preserva-
tion of the relation, harmonization of relational conflict, propriety of means, and 
supracontract norms. 
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opposition or alternate choice, but different combinations in be-
tween: legal contracting and regulatory governance may intertwine, 
substitute each other, or co-apply (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Fisher 
et al. 2011; Cannon et al., 2012). 
This means that relational regulatory systems and models are 
complex, and that their strength certainly stem from sources other 
than the normative power of positive law only. But, again, legal 
drafting, contracting and sentencing matter and can play changing 
roles within the system. I will call regulatory systems this set of co-
ordinated individual and collective complex behavior which can be 
grasped through rules, values and principles that constitute nowa-
days the social framework of the law. I will call regulatory models 
the set of structured principles, norms and rules that can be designed 
to control and monitor the interaction between technology and regu-
latory systems. I will call relational justice the set of procedural de-
vices to manage and eventually solve disputes and conflicts within 
the framework of dialogue as a source of law.  
This is the third step for relational law: when social patterns, net-
worked governance, ethical principles and legal systems are en-
trenched through the regulatory protocols of technological environ-
ments. This is properly the field in which Online Dispute Resolution 
developments (ODR), privacy by design, security by design or iden-
tity patterns take place and will operate in the next stage of the web 
(ubiquitous computing, cloud computing, open data, XML standard-
ization etc…). In this third sense, relational law refers to the point in 
which the Social Web (2.0) and the Web of Data (3.0) intersects 
with the way of regulating systems and end users behavior alike (be 
the users considered as citizens, consumers, companies or political 
organizations). A visualization of what I mean by the third stage of 
relational law may arise in the overlapping of Figures 3 and 4 (in 
2.4.3). Fig. 4 has been proposed by Jim Hendler thinking of Seman-
tic Web Services. Fig. 5 is a simple ordered schematization of the 
regulatory fields.  
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Web 3.0  
Web 2.0  Semantic Web (RDFS, 
OWL) 
Linked Data (RDF, 
SPARQL) 
 
Fig. 3. Linked Data and the SW. Source: Hendler (2009) 
2.4.3 Regulatory systems, relational justice, regulatory models 
Regulatory systems are broader than their legal side because they 
include all aspects set by players in the social, political and econom-
ic games at stake. They are situated, flow-driven, and work specifi-
cally in a multitude of similar but different evolving scenarios. As 
long as they contain procedural ways to solve and manage conflicts 
as well, they shape relational systems of justice.19  
Relational justice is thus the type of justice emerging from the dif-
ferent conceptualizations, practices and strategic moves of the actors 
dealing with, managing, or solving a controversy, quarrel, dispute, 
conflict or fight within these situated contexts and frameworks (Cas-
anovas and Poblet, 2008, 2009). Personal attitudes, moral and politi-
cal beliefs are highly relevant in this kind of situations which can be 
initially unstructured and eventually embedded or plotted onto big-
ger organizational or social conflicts. Institutions may be involved 
(or not) at different stages and at different times (Lederach, 2005). 
                                                          
19 A regulatory system can be a broad social system, with several groups, net-
works and professional people involved. It can be described and explained by 
means of statistical measures (using social indicators e.g.) and qualitative meth-
ods. We had the opportunity, e.g., to describe the social system of mediation in 
Catalonia. Results are available in Catalan and Spanish at 
http://www.llibreblancmediacio.com .  Chapter 16 of the Spanish version contains 
the state the art of ODR (years 2008-2009, Poblet et al. 2010), and the prototype 
of an electronic institution for mediation (developed by Pablo Noriega et al. 2010). 
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The situation is the same for state agencies, companies and corporate 
entities in the market.  
Regulatory systems and relational justice can be monitored by 
regulatory models. A regulatory model is the particular normative 
suit encased by platforms built up to monitor a regulatory social sys-
tem; the specific structure of principles, values, norms and rules that 
guide technical protocols, the ‘interoperativity’ of organized teams 
and the ‘interoperability’ of computer languages.20 
These concepts ―relational law, relational justice, regulatory sys-
tems and regulatory models― have to be spelled out further. They 
have to be carefully distinguished from virtual or electronic institu-
tions, corporate governance, all forms of networked governance and 
ethical informatics. From this point of view, agents, networks and 
principles are components of social regulatory systems and they 
have to be taken into account by the specific regulatory models built 
up to control and monitor the technology applied to particular fields 
―ODR platforms, security platforms, digital rights management, 
mobile applications etc. for e-commerce, e-administration, e-security 
etc.  Figure 4 shows a possible structure for regulatory models, in 
which hard law (enforceable norms), soft law (non-enforceable 
norms), networked governance (administrative, managerial norms), 
and ethics and good practices (prudential norms, technical protocols) 
are ordered along the axes of interoperability and 'interoperativity'. 
                                                          
20 I prefer to maintain separate interoperativity (referred to human coordinated or 
collective behaviour to team up) and interoperability (compatibility of computer 
languages).  
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Interoperability
Interoperativity
Institutional
Strengthening
 
Fig.4. Scheme of regulatory spaces, Interoperability/Interoperativity Axes.  
Source: Casanovas et al. 2012 
2. 5 Discussion: Dialogue as a source of law 
I have summarized so far the perspective of legal theory and so-
cio-legal approaches on agreements. My brief description did not in-
tend to be exhaustive. Three legal theories and three stages of rela-
tional law have been exposed. It is time to come back at the starting 
point and ending up with a more open discussion on some issues that 
can be raised from them.  
The starting points are the following: (i) a continuum line between 
the two poles of agreement ―as a “meeting of the minds” and 
“agreement as a contract” (see section 2.2.); (ii) a history of agree-
ments in modern and contemporary societies that reverse the value 
and role of agreements in ancient (and face to face) societies (2.2.); 
(iii) the prominent role of the state and public law in the value ac-
corded to agreements in contracts under the rule of law (2.3.); (iv) 
the agreement in classical theories of law about the existence of a 
system based on the “legal” (i.e. “valid”) use of  the physical force 
by the state (or the final ruler) (2.4); (v) the agreement in classical 
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theories of law on describing theoretically the legal space as a single 
normative system with a criterion of validity; (vi) the agreement be-
tween Hart and Ross on the existence of the legal system, the exist-
ence of a method to test the validity of norms, and (most important) 
a “shared acceptance” or “common understanding” of law by state 
officers (e.g. judges) and the civil population (2.3.2-2.3.3); (vii) the 
clash of such a perspective with more behavioral and empirical ap-
proaches to contracts from a “myriad of ways that parties could 
come to agreement” (Llewellyn) and the importance of context and 
working practices of the field (2.4.); (viii) the shift towards relation-
al contracts, and networked and corporate governance in the second 
step of the relational conception of law, in which positive statutes, 
acts and sentences are components of the regulatory framework  
(2.4.2.); (ix) the emergence of concepts such as regulatory systems, 
relational justice, regulatory models; and the entrenchment of tech-
nological environments and regulations in the next stage of the Web 
(2.4.3). 
I will address four final issues related with these points: (i) 
crowdsourcing; (ii) the relation between agreement and disagree-
ment; (iii) the notion of ‘legally valid norm’, (iv) and democratic 
values.  
All issues have to do with the idea of dialogue in the cloud. We 
might consider as cloud services infrastructures, platforms, or soft-
ware. According to the NIST standards the cloud model is composed 
of five essential characteristics, three service models, and four de-
ployment models (Srivasta, 2011).  E.g. the five essential character-
istics are: on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource 
pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured service.  
As information grows on the net, personalization and empower-
ment of users becomes an issue, because knowledge is increasingly 
produced through cooperation and participation. The Web fosters 
participation, but at the same time, risks or threads to citizens are 
higher too. Crowdsourcing is one side; identity management is the 
other side of the picture. Trust and security come along. The Internet 
meta-system layer, as was put forward by Kim Cameron (2005), co-
exists with the Linked Open Data movement. Perhaps for the first 
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time, then, regulations have to cope with a semantic structure which 
organizes them as metadata.  
2.5.1 Crowdsourcing 
Originally, this term was introduced in relation to distributive la-
bor. Different types of crowdsourcing have been distinguished in re-
cent times (Geiger et al. 2011). Most of the more successful exam-
ples, like the Wikipedia, may be defined as non-profit collective 
aggregation of information stemming from micro-tasks widely dis-
tributed across the Web, and freely performed by people. Therefore, 
crowdsourcing  implies much more than a new way to recollect in-
formation or to respond to labor offers or contests —following the 
Amazon Mechanical Turk or Microworks.com models— because (i) 
it points at the personalization of services and applications, (ii) it 
creates a link between Web 2.0 and 3.0 (the Web of Data), for it cre-
ates the conditions to transform the aggregation of individual infor-
mation into the clustering, classification and enhancement of collec-
tive knowledge, (iii) it broadens up and enhances a democratic way 
of living and behaving in the global world.  
This is the main reason why people use it when they need it, react-
ing to events that concern them or into which they want to get in-
volved. No measures based on routine or loyal customer behavior 
are accurate enough to capture this public dimension. The broad 
democratic political model to be implemented cannot be taken for 
granted, as the integration between the regulatory forms of law, rela-
tional governance and what Charles Petrie (2010) calls Emerging 
Collectivities (EC) has to be thought on new bases. Crowdsourcing 
can be expanded then into crowdservicing (Davies, 2011).  
5.5.2 Agreement and Disagreement 
Classical positivist theories (including Ross’) assumed the exist-
ence of a united central state ―a national order― and a legal order 
as a common project to explain obedience or acceptance of norms. 
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Both aspects are interconnected, and point at a legal theory as a priv-
ileged approach. However, power, not empowerment, is the subject-
matter or idée force that guides the argumentation process in classi-
cal legal theories.  
This is not to blame. Hobbes, Kelsen, Ross or Hart had to tackle 
the problem of violence and survival in a convulse world. As 
Abizadeh (2011) has shown, the primary source of war, according to 
Hobbes, is not necessity, greed or even glory, but weakness, human 
disagreement. Disagreements can turn into deep disagreements; and 
this is an existential stage in which argumentation and rationality 
stop, for they undercut all essential conditions to arguing (Fogelin, 
1985).  
However, philosophical argumentation is nonpreemptive: “philo-
sophical issues are always such that arguments of prima facie co-
gency can be built up for a cluster of mutually incompatible thesis” 
(Rescher, 1978: 220). This is the case for legal theory as well. 
The notion of “genuine disagreement” was used by Ronald 
Dworkin (1986) to challenge what he called “the semantic sting” 
―that lawyers follow certain linguistic criteria for judging proposi-
tions of law. Therefore, Hart (and other positivists) would derive the 
use, the pragmatics of law from the semantics of legal language, a 
mistake that would prevent them of properly explaining theoretical 
disagreements.  
Dworkin’s criticism raised a passionate debate in legal philoso-
phy, especially after Hart’s posthumous Postcript to The Concept of 
Law (second edition, 1994), where Hart defended what was called 
inclusive positivism, a reassessment of his philosophy as a method 
for descriptive (non normative or interpretative) jurisprudence (see 
the essays contained in Coleman, 2001; especially Raz, 2001, and 
Endicott, 2001). 
Dworkin pointed indeed at the nature of Hart’s linguistic en-
dorsement. What does exactly means for officers to share a rule of 
recognition? Where the common understanding of law or (for citi-
zens) the acceptance of a primary rule come from? 
Pettit has followed recently the same procedure at refining the 
meaning of natural language to better define what the content of a 
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norm is. He fills what he calls “the norm-normative gap” ―the fact 
that a norm is such a norm and not a mere behavioral pattern “since 
people give acceptance or approval to those who conform with the 
regularity and or reject or disapprove of those who deviate” (2010). 
This is Hart’s internal point of view, which Pettit elaborates to as-
sess meaning to the norm of honesty as a particular case ―“norms 
come about as a result of rationally intelligible adjustments between 
the parties” (ibid.).  
The question of emergence of norms is an important one and can 
be studied empirically, because there is not a single general answer 
for the problem (see e.g. McAdams, 2010, for a different solution) 
it). At this level, it makes sense to distinguish carefully between two 
meanings of agreement: B-agreements (being in agreement) and H-
agreements (having an agreement) (Paglieri, 2012).  
From cognitive and social sciences it makes all the sense fleshing 
out these concepts seeking for micro-foundations for agents’ behav-
ior as well (Castelfranchi, 2003). Emergence of meaning and in-
teroperability is another dimension of the problem, with a variety of 
approaches ―specifying the conditions under which two individuals 
(or one individual at two points in time) will infer they share a dif-
fuse referent (Chaigneau et al. 2012); or conceiving semantic in-
teroperability as a coordination problem between the world, infor-
mation systems, and human users (grounding semantics, semiotic 
dynamics) (Steels, 2006).  
Philosophy can support theories and empirical testing on analyti-
cal grounds. We can find a correlative example on H-agreements in 
Black (2006), preferring the offer-acceptance model over the under-
taking-based model. 
It seems to me that we should maintain separate from the analyti-
cal point of view agreements in language and agreements of lan-
guage. Wittgenstein made a substantial contribution when code or 
symbolism are involved, distinguishing in his late works agreement 
in judgment and agreement in opinion. To disagree means having 
the capacity to agree, first, in a common communicative ground. 
Agreement in judgment would mean that what is shared is the lan-
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guage as a ‘form of life’; the role inter-subjective agreement plays 
for the possibility of linguistic communication. 
As said, this kind of fundamental questions can and should be 
faced not only from the philosophical point of view but from the 
empirical one. The assumption that obedience or acceptance of 
norms has an “internal” side than can be solved only by refining the 
natural meaning; id est, that normative agreements “emerge” natu-
rally from the social body, is a strong assumption that can be put un-
der the light of knowledge acquisition through data analysis.  
Clearly, assumptions on the general picture ―the sovereign state, 
the division onto citizens and officers…― played a role (and a ma-
jor one) in the way classical legal theory faced the analysis of 
agreements and rules.  
5.5.3 Validity and regulatory models 
Equally, in the new scenarios raised by crowdsourcing, cloud 
computing, and relational law and justice, assumptions about the 
whole context have an impact on the way agreements and norms are 
faced. We generally deal with complex environments, in which 
power is fragmented and divided into multiple sources of authority, 
with different levels and degrees of compulsory force, and different 
jurisdictions.  
In networked governance, legality anchors the intended behavior 
of state agencies, their relationships, and their relationships with cit-
izens (see Fig. 4). Hard and soft laws are commonly differentiated 
by the existence of legal norms. But legality is situated within na-
tional, communitarian (European), or international borders. In the 
cloud, nevertheless, the sixty million controversies that e-Bay has to 
solve every year, e.g., occur in what we could understand as a deref-
erenced legality. There is a procedure to be implemented and fol-
lowed that is eventually ground on the conditions of dialogue be-
tween the parties, and the incentives and disincentives at stake (e.g. 
reputation), not because there is no other way to enforce a final rul-
ing, but because actually the technological nature of the web can 
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implement a new balance between public power and personal em-
powerment. 
This state of affairs reminds the situation of agreements in pre-
modern societies, in absence of the state but with a strong need to 
maintain the balance of a living social regulation (see section 2.2.). 
Online Dispute Resolution procedures lie on ordered steps and the 
structure of rational agreements ―usually between only two differ-
ent sides (Lodder and Zeleznikow, 2010). However, there are other 
scenarios regarding public goods (e.g. ecological conflicts, polluters 
etc.) in which non-binding voluntary agreements are most effective 
if selective, because power is still an issue even in non-enforceable, 
i.e. non-legally binding, situations (Glachant, 2007). This is the first 
argument in favor of considering dialogue as a primary source of 
law.  
I will elaborate this position stemming from a second argument on 
the emergence of validity as a result of agreements. My position is 
that this is so when bindness is put aside through the same condi-
tions in which it appears in a conventional legal reasoning process. 
Validity, legal bindness is not strictly needed, but it is a factor that 
co-exists with other scenarios in the web. Let’s elaborate on that. 
Semantics has a long history in law as well, since Hohfeldian jural 
schemes. Hohfeld, von Wright, Alchourrón and Bulygin, Lindahl, 
McCarty, Sergot, among many others, built up a normative space in 
which it was held to perform the distinction of legal from non-legal 
norms (or deontic effects from other modal ones). One of the last 
contributions is due to Giovanni Sartor (2008, 2009a, 2009b). Fol-
lowing Ross’s suggestions on inference (see section 2.3.2) Sartor 
dwells on semantic inference. He claims that “certain features of a 
norm entail the norm’s legal validity on the basis of their ability to 
justify the norm’s legal bindingness (through the mediation of legal 
validity”. This means (i) that a norm is automatically enforceable if 
it is legal, (ii) that legality is a deontic property that “supervenes” in 
a process of legal reasoning; (iii) that  legality is a moral property (in 
a broad sense).  
However, if legal bindingness depends on a test on the acceptabil-
ity of premises in an argumentation process, i.e., it is considered 
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strictly dependent on validity as an evaluative concept, then, I think 
that bindingness requires a theory of democracy (broader than legal 
theory) to set the acceptable criteria and values to be implemented in 
a legal reasoner. The political side of validity cannot be avoided, 
even accepting Sartor’s moral distance. Even the late Ross asserted 
that “feelings of validity” are “the very foundation of all politically 
organized life” (1968).  
I do not consider legality as a moral property, but as a political 
one; i.e., not only applies through legal reasoning, but through the 
diverse moves of negotiating agreements (and at the different layers 
of the possible disputes as well), soft law, good practices and ethical 
codes than constitute the line of institutional strengthening; that is to 
say, the resulting vector of a regulatory space which is broader than 
the application of legal norms. If this is so, validity goes along a 
continuum that cannot be only linearly determined by a unilateral 
process of reasoning, but by a set of variable procedures that are 
themselves negotiated, discussed, evaluated, and eventually 
changed, in a dialogical process among different agents or stake-
holders (the notion of “meta-agreements” points at this situation). 
In a situation of dereferenced legality, what it immediately pops 
up is not the rationality of the argumentation or the enforceability of 
the agreement, but the effective satisfacing behavior of both (or 
more) parties, be they optimal or suboptimal. 
There is still a third related argument in favor of considering dia-
logue as a source of law. 
Many years ago, André Valente and Joost Breuker (1994) sug-
gested that ontologies could help to bridge the gap between Artifi-
cial Intelligence and Legal Theory, and in fact many legal ontologies 
have been constructed since then. Sartor correctly states that con-
flicts between inferential and ontological approaches need to be con-
sidered “as a dialectical balance and co-evolution”, and this would 
require that lawyers and ontological engineers “have the ability to 
continuously adjust their onto-terminological constructions as the 
law evolves” (2009b).   
I think the analysis can go a bit further: reconciling ontologies and 
inferential schemes requires an adjustment not only on legal but on 
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social basis as well. Therefore, I would suggest the adjustment be 
produced taking into account the democratic values carried out by 
citizen participation and the evolution of the Web of Data. This 
means that a double and, if possible, coordinated process of dialogue 
has to take place ―between personal, local (or singular) knowledge, 
and expert, global (or general) knowledge. 
5.5.4 Democratic values  
Democratic values are consubstantial to crowdsourcing, privacy, 
data protection, and the transparency and accountability principles 
that inform Linked Open Data, but they are not strictly necessary to 
construct artificial societies or MAS. This means that they have to 
be consciously designed, reflected and implemented, because I do 
not think they can be simply derived from any theoretical legal mod-
el alone. This goes back to dialogue and participation as a source 
both of legitimacy and legality.  
A political reading, or a pragmatic epistemological position, em-
phasizes, as e.g. Robert Brandom (2008) does, that the possibility of 
disagreement and dissent is a condition of democracy. Disagreement 
is then viewed as “[...] an absolutely essential element of discursive 
practice. Without the right to disagree, there is no language”. 
Besides, from a linguistic point of view, it seems that free speech 
and dissent have (even through “non politically correct language”) a 
positive effect on the evolving of democratic systems (Stromer-
Galley and Muhlberger, 2009). Diversity of opinion seems to rein-
force models of deliberation on the web too (Karlsson, 2010). How-
ever, I would not defend the existence of an implicit common law 
model to articulate a linguistic model of normativity as a political 
ground for the rule of law in the WWW. There are other means to 
seek for collective aggregation of information or knowledge than as-
suming normative restrictions at the speaker level.  
The proposal of an I-thou structure of normative scorekeeping and 
discursive updating instead of an I-we structure (Brandom), or the 
“we-mode social groups” hypothesis put forward by Tuomela (2007) 
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stress the function of collective action in the construction of a com-
mon social order based on agreement (implicit or explicit). 
From the legal point of view, it is my contention that the basic 
question posed by Cass Sunstein (1994, 1996) some time ago is still 
a valid starting point to reflect on the implementation of a democrat-
ic model:   
How is law possible in a heterogeneous society, composed of people who 
sharply disagree about basic values? (…)  Much of the answer to this puzzle 
lies in an appreciation of how people who disagree on fundamental issues can 
achieve incompletely theorized agreements on particular cases. 
People disagree everywhere and on everything, and very likely 
they will keep disagreeing everywhere and on everything. But (and 
this is Sunstein’s strong point) they do not need to agree on general 
principles to reach agreements: “people from divergent starting-
points, or with uncertainty about their starting-points, can converge 
on a rule of a low-level judgment” (ibid. 145). 
More recently, Sunstein has warned against the biased reasoning 
trends and polarization to which the blogosphere is prone. There is 
an ongoing interesting discussion on meta-agreements ―the concep-
tualization of issues at stake, the context of sets of judgments over 
multiple interconnected propositions― and single-peakedness 
―individuals rationalize their preferences in terms of a common is-
sue dimension― to overcome the well-known voting paradoxes. 
(List, 2007; Ottonelli and Porello, 2012).  
 I still think that there is no valid argument against the capacity to 
produce new knowledge through the empowerment of individual 
participation in the web. Developing these theses falls out of the 
scope of the present chapter. However, I hope to have shown that 
both theoretical and empirical approaches are needed to face them in 
a consistent manner. 
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